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Introduction 
  In recent decades the concept of civil society has played a central role in the popular 
political discourse of, and scholarly commentary on, Scottish nationalism (e.g., Brown et al. 
1998; Maxwell 1999; Morton 1999).  Lindsay Paterson (1994) has argued that Scotland’s 
robust civil society helped it preserve a high degree of institutional autonomy after the Union 
of 1707, and that the current process of devolution is a way of preserving that autonomy.  
Tom Nairn (1997: 73-89) objects to Paterson’s argument, viewing civil society as a concept 
specifically descriptive of Scotland’s elite political management without its own state in the 
eighteenth century.  He views civil society as a misleadingly apolitical concept, preferring 
instead to talk of ‘civic nationalism’, and to link civicness to explicitly politicised national 
identities.  Be that as it may, civil society is so much a part of the common parlance of 
Scottish politics today, that it perhaps makes more sense to re-politicise it, than to rule it out 
of court.  Moreover, the usefulness of the concept lies not in whether it is a satisfactory 
substitute for the high politics of statehood, but rather in the ways it can help map the 
lineaments of power that join the state to a broader society, through various means of 
association, organisation, mobilisation, and opinion formation (Hearn 2000: 19-22). 
  This article attempts to develop such a repoliticised notion of civil society in three ways.  
First, by examining shifts in class structure, party system, and political leadership in Scotland 
in this century, then by defining civil society in Scotland, and finally, at a more theoretical 
level, by using Weber’s interdependent concepts of class, status groups, and parties as a 
device for rethinking civil society in general.  Doing this I believe helps illuminate another 
issue.  It has become common to argue that there has been a ‘dealignment’ of class and voting 
behaviour since the 1960s (Särlvik and Crewe 1983), sometimes seen as heralding ‘the end of 
class’ (Clark and Lipset 1991) and the rise of ‘identity’ as a basis for politics.  In keeping 
with this, analysis of survey research by Brown et al. (1999) indicates that class structure 
fails to account for substantial divergence in voting behaviour between Scotland and England, 
namely stronger support for Labour and weaker support for the Conservatives in Scotland, 
and that class location is a relatively weak predictor of party choice in Scotland.  Instead, 
strong identification as working class and as Scottish are better predictors of voting behaviour 
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(particularly support for the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Labour).  I think that a critical 
conception of civil society, informed by Weber, can help make sense of this apparent 
ascendancy of identity over class in political behaviour. 
 
Changing Patterns of Class and Party Support 
  A distinctive pattern of party support emerges from the analysis in The Scottish Electorate 
(Brown et al. 1999).  While broadly dealigned, there are significant differences.  As we move 
up the class scale that is employed--working class, manual foremen and technicians, petty 
bourgeoisie, routine non-manual, salariat1--we see highly uneven distributions of class 
support for parties gradually even out as we approach the salariat.  The overall pattern is one 
in which support for the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats is relatively restricted to 
the upper three classes, especially the salariat, while Labour and the SNP draw support more 
evenly across the class spectrum, with much greater support than the other two parties from 
the bottom two classes (see table 3.5, p.54).  It is specifically within the top three classes, and 
especially the salariat, that the notion of partisan dealignment is most compelling, a situation 
accentuated by dealignment across four political parties.  This data might suggest a very low 
relevance of membership in the salariat to any understanding of party preferences, but we 
might equally see it as an indication of important divisions within the salariat around issues 
of economic and social policy, and Scotland’s constitutional future.  A key point here is that 
in the latter twentieth century the professionals of the salariat tend to provide the leadership 
of both civil society and the political parties. 
  We can look at transformations of class in Scotland over the last century to see if that sheds 
light on how the patterns outlined above came into being.  John Foster (1992) has focused on 
a paradox in the history of classes and mass party politics in Scotland.  Simply put, it is that 
the long slow decline of heavy industry in Scotland, and its piecemeal replacement by lighter 
industries and an expanding service sector, has corresponded with a secular rise, rather than a 
decline, in support for the Labour Party.  Considering that the SNP has achieved ‘number 
two’ status partly by imitating traditional Labour policies only underscores this paradox.  
Foster’s answer to this riddle is that, compared to England, the working class in Scotland was 
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relatively unorganised and divided before World War Two by the coercive power of  strong 
local capital bolstered by Protestant-Catholic factionalism, whereas since then the Scottish 
working/middle class has become more unified behind the project of the welfare state and by 
a collective, national relationship of uncertainty to more remote loci of capital.  Others have 
been less inclined to see this process as one of consolidation of class interests, in view of the 
ramifying complexity of occupational structures under deindustrialisation, which produces a 
varied series of manual and non-manual occupational segments (Brown et al. 1999; McCrone 
1992a).  However, there is general agreement that Scottish politics is shaped by a widespread, 
moderate social democratic ethos which sees a significant place for state-led action in regard 
to economic and social policies and wealth redistribution.  The question is, does this reflect a 
relative dominance of the political culture by a modern, complex working class, or an unusual 
national solidarity across class divisions?  More cynically, this left-of-centre ethos might be 
viewed as an ideological process obscuring the very dealignment of class interest and party 
politics we have been discussing.  
  One of the problems of dealignment theory is that it tends to uncritically assume a marxist 
model of two great classes, reflected in two great parties, as the normal state of affairs in 
modern mass politics, whereas this might simply be a historical form peculiar to bi-partisan 
systems in the process of industrialisation.  If we assume, in line with Weber (1978: 302-7), a 
more complex class system involving varied dimensions of competing interests, then we are 
likely to expect shifting historical alliances between classes and class fractions, generating 
imprecise correspondences between what we might take to be the objective interests of 
various class groups, and the distributions of support for parties and policies.  With this 
perspective in mind, let us turn to a more detailed look at class transformations in twentieth-
century Scotland, as provided by the work of David McCrone (1992b; 1996). 
  McCrone focuses on another paradox, related to Foster’s (McCrone 1996: 105-6).  He 
argues that given the basic underlying similarities in industrial and occupational structures in 
Scotland and England, social class does not easily explain their divergent patterns of voting 
behaviour, especially in regard to support for Labour and the Conservatives.  McCrone 
suggests that we must look for intervening variables affecting the ‘class culture’, in 
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particular, he credits the distinctive institutional nexus of Scottish civil society--law, 
education, churches, local government--and the way these have shaped a social ethos and 
political values (see also Paterson 1994).  As McCrone puts it: 
 
Ideas about class and social opportunity are firmly embedded in Scottish civil society.  
That is the clue to understanding the culture of class.  How people act will not be the 
result of automatic responses to structural dictates, but will result from the meanings, 
values and ideas which structural aspects have in the society (McCrone 1996: 115)  
 
  This account of institutional distinctiveness needs to be understood in tandem with 
McCrone’s earlier assessment of changing elites in twentieth-century Scotland (1992b).  By 
1900 Scotland had developed a strong indigenous industrial bourgeoisie which had inter-
married with the landed gentry, developing complex patterns of corporate ownership 
clustering around capital interests in Glasgow and Edinburgh.  This mixture of capital and 
large rentier interests achieved political leadership through the Conservative and Liberal-
Unionist Parties and an ideology which fused imperialism, unionism and Protestantism, 
attracting the allegiances of middle and working classes.  The relatively small educated 
professional class was drawn from this elite mixed with the upwardly mobile from the rural 
middle classes.  In the cities a petit bourgeoisie functioned as a small rentier class, and 
dominated local government.  Elected as ‘Independents’, and later through loose coalitions 
styled ‘Progressive’ and ‘Moderate’, they espoused a supposedly ‘non-political’ approach to 
the prudent management of urban affairs.  In the countryside a couple of centuries of 
agricultural ‘improvement’ had substantially diminished the rural bourgeoisie and proletariat, 
further mechanisation leading to extreme contraction and marginalisation of these classes in 
the inter-war years. 
  Continued technological change and the growth of the welfare state had a profound effect on 
this distribution of class powers.  Not only did the industrial proletariat develop a distinctive 
political influence through the growing Labour Party after World War One, but the 
indigenous industrial bourgeoisie was gradually partially displaced from its socially dominant 
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position, by competition from external capital, by increased government control of industry 
through centralised planning, and by their own propensity to reinvest abroad.  Meanwhile 
housing reforms meant that the urban petit bourgeoisie’s position as a small rentier class was 
weakened, leading them to become more detached from the large bourgeoisie, more a class 
unto themselves, and the growth in government bureaucracy and ancillary services led to an 
expansion and broadening of the professional classes, in a way that blended with the 
developing, more highly educated, white collar proletariat.  Moreover, the personnel of this 
diverse professional/service sector class milieu, thanks to the mid-century opportunities for 
advancement offered by the welfare state, has been increasingly drawn from the shrinking 
ranks of the of the older industrial proletariat.  My language here is vague because this is an 
analytically difficult category, a class continuum made up of many fractions which, under the 
right conditions, could undergo considerable internal political differentiation.  There are 
likely to be profound differences in socialisation and life chances between lawyers, school 
teachers, call centre workers, and fast food servers.  While the old professions (doctors, 
lawyers, professors, etc.) and a service sector proletariat should be distinguished, it is of some 
consequence that they are now linked through a gradated and overlapping hierarchy, 
generated under the aegis of the managerial welfare state, and that the occupants of these 
positions may have similar class origins in the previous generation. 
  Thus the c.1900 dynamic of class-based political leadership through the party system has 
been eroded and replaced.  The current big business class is substantially diminished 
compared to its predecessor, and the remaining aristocracy and landed gentry politically 
marginalised and hampered by an ‘alien’ (i.e. anglified) status.  Over the century they have 
learned to share the field of political/class leadership with the broad managerial/professional 
class, spanning public and private sectors, that forms the upper tier of the complex class-
milieu hierarchy just described.  Today the experienced leadership of the four main political 
parties tends to come from these ranks.  Transformations of state, class, and party system in 
the twentieth century have had a profound effect.  Scots, and Britons as a whole, no longer 
accept the kind of naturalised notions of class hierarchy that were prevalent in the Victorian 
and Edwardian eras (the embattled reputation of the monarchy, and the looming fate of the 
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House of Lords are further indications of this).  British and Scottish conceptions of 
appropriate class relations have moved several degrees toward the US model.  There is still 
class hierarchy, of course, but it is now the ‘salariat’ that stands at the head, and that must 
lead precisely by obscuring its class distinctiveness, and highlighting its interdigitation with 
the gradated welfare state class structure.  In general, Labour and the SNP are succeeding in 
this task, while the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats are not.  While the class 
leadership of all four parties is relatively similar, these latter two are more grounded in the 
older landed, commercial and professional classes, and thus carry baggage of an older, more 
culturally recognisable elitism, along with the distinctive interests of those class fractions. 
  With these transformations of class and state the political leadership potential of the salariat 
in Scotland has become inextricably linked to the issue of devolution and self-government 
(Paterson 1991).  In the world wrought by the welfare state and the penetration of non-
Scottish capital, to advocate laissez faire and minimal government is to appear not to lead.  
This has been the problem of the Conservatives in Scotland--not simply that they espouse a 
social ethos out of step with the Scottish norm--but that by current Scottish standards, they 
have refused to lead.   The Liberal Democrats have an historic commitment to devolution and 
federalism in Britain, and have played an important role the political mobilisation that led to 
the new parliament.  But in a sense, with their rurally rooted, respectable professional middle 
class credentials, they arrived at the ideal combination of entrenchment in the salariat along 
with pro-devolution politics too early.  In the popular imagination, despite social democratic 
policies, they are not plausible as a mass party, unable to elide the difference between the 
salariat which is their home-base and the broader middle/working class.  Here both Labour 
and the SNP have the advantage of having come of age through the very creation of the 
contemporary welfare state class system--they are creatures of it.  They have naturally 
appended themselves to the modern Scottish salariat as it has grown.  Despite early 
commitments to home rule, Labour has had a commitment to political leadership through 
centralised policy formation at Westminster since the middle of the century, and for a long 
time this made the party reluctant or ambivalent about a devolved form of leadership.  But the 
long years of the north-south divide and Conservative government, along with Scottish 
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resistance to a UK level retreat in the Party from traditional social democratic policies (i.e., 
resistance to ‘New Labour’), has created a  situation in which home rule became an essential 
ingredient in political leadership in Scotland (or at the very least, the appearance of 
leadership).  Meanwhile, the creeping professionalisation and embourgeoisment of the party 
leadership across the century has given it a firm place within the salariat.  The SNP has 
eclectic roots in terms of class, and long vacillated between ‘party’ and ‘movement’ strategies 
in its campaign for independence.  But in the 1960s the SNP began to develop into a viable 
party, and by the 1980s was shedding its earlier petit bourgeois image.  Whereas Labour has 
had to get behind home rule over the past twenty years in order to appear to lead in Scotland 
and thus justify its broad support, the SNP has struggled to expand its middle and working 
class support and its presence in local government in order to appear serious and experienced 
enough to handle the new form of political leadership it’s members have so passionately 
advocated.     
 
Civil Society and the ‘New Class’ 
  As suggested at the outset, civil society has served both as an analytic tool for academics 
studying Scottish politics (Paterson 1998; USGS 1998), and as a popular rallying cry for pro-
home rule activists.  The term is often used almost as a shorthand for the familiar triumvirate 
of church, law and education preserved and entrenched in the Act of Union.  But more 
generally it indicates the much broader range of non-governmental and quasi-governmental 
institutional bodies, such as the Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC), Action Together by 
Churches in Scotland (ACTS), the Educational Institute of Scotland (EIS), the umbrella 
organisation The Scottish Council of Voluntary Organisations (SCVO), and significantly, the 
numerous cross-party campaigning groups such as the Campaign for a Scottish Parliament 
and the Scottish Constitutional Convention that helped prepare the way for the new 
parliament.  This is only an indicative list.  It is interesting to note that through bodies such as 
the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (CoSLA), institutions of local government are 
often assimilated to this civil society nexus, despite ultimately being organs of the state.  
Correspondingly, the institutions of the Scottish media (newspapers, radio, television) are 
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often treated as more marginal to this nexus, and representative bodies of the business 
community (e.g. the Scottish Federation of Small Businesses) are often conspicuously absent.   
  To be fair, civic activists in Scotland are often aware and concerned about this lopsided 
conception of civil society, and efforts have been made to think about the business 
community’s relationship to the new parliament, about which many sectors of the business 
community have been less than enthusiastic (Brown and McCrone 1999).  But the main point 
still stands: in keeping with Scotland’s left-of-centre political values and support for the 
welfare state, civil society in Scotland tends to be popularly conceived as a matter of service 
and welfare oriented public bodies, and not in terms of corporate or individual agents in the 
marketplace.  Thus the popular notion of civil society at play in this context owes very little 
to Marx’s well known indictment of it as a realm of alienated capitalist competition in the 
marketplace, a ‘bellum omnium contra omnes’ (Marx 1994: 37), and much more to a kind of 
fusion of a Gramscian notion of para-state institutions of great strategic political importance 
(Gramsci 1971: 210-276), and a Tocquevillian idea of intermediate organisation between the 
populace and the state, sustained by a spirit of voluntarism (Ehrenberg 1999: 144-69).  The 
popular use of the term has been influenced by left intellectuals in Scotland and Britain who 
have revived the ideas of Gramsci over the last two decades (e.g. Hall 1988), and taken 
inspiration from the anti-statist civil society discourses generated in Poland and Eastern 
Europe during the decline of the Soviet Empire (Pelczynski 1988; Havel 1988).  But 
intellectual fashions can only have influence on popular discourse if they seem to fit the 
reality people are confronted with, and in Scotland the long confrontation between an ethos of 
social democratic corporatism and an ideologically hostile Conservative government seems to 
have been decisive in insuring a congruence of rhetoric and reality.  Apart from this 
ideological confrontation however, there is a distinctive institutional density to Scottish social 
structure, built up historically, ad hoc, through the course of this century, to which ‘civil 
society’ mundanely refers.  
  What is significant for the present argument is the close correspondence between this 
particular national conception of civil society, its institutional reality, and the life paths and 
careers of the salariat and the broader white collar working-middle class to which I have 
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suggested it is closely historically tied.  Indeed, it is the pervasiveness of this civil society 
nexus in Scottish social life that has helped generate a sense of unity and consensus behind 
social democracy and the devolution project in Scotland, in spite of the considerable 
gradations of class it contains.  The salaried academic and the waged lower level bureaucrat 
that probably would have felt greater social distance a couple of generations ago now find 
their distinctive fortunes none the less contained within this common institutional nexus, an 
array of class fractions sharing a corporatised fate.  About twenty years ago Alvin Gouldner 
(1979) adapted Djilas’s (1957) concept of ‘The New Class’ to describe the social tier of 
technocrats, experts, and managers generated by the interacting demands of capitalism and 
the modern state over the last century.  Narrowly defined this referred to a new species of 
intellectuals commanding specialised knowledge and cultural capital; applied more broadly it 
included the new educated middle classes associated with the expanding service and public 
sectors.  At the turn of the century members of this New Class often provided leadership and 
key sectors of support to both nationalist (cf. Mann 1993: 546-596) and socialist (cf. Levy 
1987) movements.  During the middle years of this century, these New Classes became 
strongly associated with the technocratic projects of Keynesian and socialist states in the west 
and east respectively.  But with the retrenchments of the welfare state since the 1970s, the 
latest generation of the New Class has had to reconfigure, and rethink, its social role.  The 
Scottish demand for devolution and/or independence reflects in part this process of New 
Class intellectuals redefining and reconstructing their positions, including conceptions of 
social obligation and responsibility, in a changing political economic environment.  In a sense 
they are reclaiming the institutions of state and civil society, and reaffirming their 
interdependent relationship, because that is where this sector of society is bound to find its 
way in life.  The fact that ‘civil society’ has become a label of self-ascription for middle class 
intellectuals and activists in recent years in Scotland indicates, I would argue, a need to re-
establish and revalorise the legitimacy of the New Class in a world where its estrangement 
from the state, and in some cases redefinition as a threat to society, has created a crisis of 
identity and social standing.  The formation of the New Class is a general phenomenon in the 
industrialised countries, but in the Scottish context a significant portion of the New Class has 
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found its particular fortunes in the rather corporatist structures of a national civil society.  
Thus a highly general process of class and state transformation takes on a specific, localised 
political form. 
  Rogers Brubaker has drawn on the ‘new institutionalism’ in sociology in order to highlight 
the ‘...constitutive rather than merely constraining role of institutions...’ (1996: 24).  His aim 
is to demonstrate how current nationalisms and national identities in the former Soviet Union 
are not simply ancient ethnic sentiments long held in check, and now unleashed, but rather 
that they were very much re-created and sustained through the policies of the USSR, in which 
they served as legal categories both of territorial authority and personal identity.  As he 
observes: 
 
A whole series of features of the Soviet nationality regime...were radically 
incompatible with the organizational model of the nation-state.  These included the 
Soviet system of ethno-territorial federalism; the elaborate codification of, and 
pervasive significance attached to, personal nationality; the cultivation of a large 
number of distinct national intelligentsias; the cultivation of distinct national cadres, 
allowed, for the most part, to live and work in “their own” national territories; the 
deliberate policy of nation building, aimed at the consolidation of non-Russian 
nations, pursued in the 1920s and early 1930s; the cultivation and codification of a 
large number of national languages; and the development of an elaborate system of 
schooling, including higher education, in non-Russian languages (1996: 29). 
 
  While I am sceptical about the lessons to be learned for Scotland from the conceptions of 
civil society generated in Eastern Europe around the unravelling of the USSR, Brubaker’s 
more general ‘institutionalist’ point seems acutely relevant to the present discussion.  Scottish 
nationalism, understood broadly to include both those who support only devolution and those 
who prefer independence, has been similarly sustained and reinforced by a series of 
institutional conditions that have developed over the years, only to be increasingly exposed as 
the national fault lines of a changing system of British politics.  To be sure, the Soviet project 
was one of catch-up industrialisation and state-building, while Scotland’s institutional 
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distinctiveness within the British union is more a result of ad hoc adjustments in its much 
longer relationship to a first rising and later declining empire.  But the more general point is 
that Scotland’s civil society is a prime example of this institutionalisation process, including 
the institutionalisation of class and national identities, which have been formed by material 
interests in, and allegiances to, the institutions of civil society. 
 
Revisiting Weber: 
  A series of historical changes, some of them touched on above, have conditioned the general 
shift of social analytic attention away from ‘class’ and toward ‘identity’ over the last two 
decades.  The growth and diversification of middle classes under state managerialism has 
rendered class structures more complex.  Greater globalisation of relations of production have 
rendered class relations in the industrial west more obscure, partially restructuring them in 
terms of transnational neo-colonial relationships.  The decline and fall of the Soviet Union 
has eliminated the Cold War ideological and geopolitical axis of communism versus 
capitalism, and delegitimated socialism more generally.  This process has been accompanied 
by the spread, out from their heartlands in the US and Britain, of neoliberal economic regimes 
that resist class as a central framework of social, economic, and political analysis.  
Meanwhile the expanding middle classes mentioned above have provided the main personnel 
of an array of new social movements that appear to be oriented around issues other than class, 
often styled ‘post-materialist values’.  And a part of this process has been the sharper 
articulation of politicised identities around forms of exploitation, domination, and exclusion 
not reducible to economic structures, and new claims to rights and the recognition of 
citizenship.  It is worth reminding ourselves of this broad historical context, lest we too easily 
attribute changing intellectual frameworks to a simple refinement of ideas and understanding. 
  A thorough review of the debates around the declining significance of class (e.g., Pakulski 
and Waters 1996) and the increasing significance of identity (e.g., Cohen 1985) is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  Instead, as a way of opening up some of the issues I have been 
addressing above, I will propose a particular reading of Weber’s discussion of classes, status 
groups, and parties that I think might be helpful.2  This approach immediately presents a 
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puzzle, because of the dominant role of Marx and marxian thinking in class theory.  For the 
more orthodox marxist, to turn to Weber is to abandon class as an explanatory framework.  
None the less, many attempts to sustain marxist analyses of class have involved importing 
Weberian elements (cf., Wright, et al. 1989), much work consciously attempts to synthesise 
Marx and Weber (e.g., Mann 1986), and many avowed Weberians will claim to be employing 
a conception of class, regardless of what marxists think.  On the other hand, although Weber 
is not often made central to new theories of identity and social movements (e.g., Touraine 
1988; Melucci 1989), he is often present indirectly through the influence of such figures as 
Habermas (1981), and the entire project of trying to understand collective social action and 
its attendant identities can be construed as fundamentally Weberian.   
  One of the ironies of marxist-Weberian debates about conceptions of class is that the (very 
real) differences have tended to be highlighted, and Weber’s deeper  engagement with the 
analytical problems of the marxian approach have tended to be obscured.3  Commonly, 
Weber is represented as making two main contributions.  First, in defining class in terms of 
life chances determined by situations in regard to property and markets, rather than in terms 
of relations of production, it is often said that ‘...his is a consumption theory of class rather 
than a production theory’ (Pakulski and Waters 1996: 15).  But in fact, in discussing classes 
Weber placed as much emphasis on what one sells at the market (e.g., labour) as on what one 
buys (1978: 302).  And he uses the consumption-production dichotomy not to distinguish his 
conception of class from a marxian one, but to distinguish between his conceptions of classes 
and status groups : 
 
With some over-simplification, one might thus say that classes are stratified according 
to their relations to the production and acquisition of goods; whereas status groups are 
stratified according to the principles of their consumption of goods as represented by 
special styles of life (1978: 937; emphasis in original). 
 
  Secondly, by proposing this multi-dimensional notion of class situations (property and 
markets), and adding the notions of status groups, Weber is generally credited with 
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recognising that stratification and power have multiple dimensions.  The Weberian rejoinder 
to marxian theory is thus often summed up as: not one system of stratification, but many.  
This is fine, but it misses a lot of what Weber was up to.   
  To put it back in context we have to remind ourselves of two things.  First, that the key 
concern underlying Weber’s sociology was to understand human behaviour in terms of the 
rationalities shaping social action (1978: 3-26).  This is why questions of meaning and 
problems of understanding loom large in his work, because they are inevitably involved in 
any account of conscious social action.  Secondly, the key problem bedevilling Marx’s theory 
of class (or at least one of the major ones), was the problem of class consciousness, of the 
transformation of ‘class-in-itself’ into ‘class-for-itself’.  Despite the brave promises and 
predictions, this has proven to be a process that only happens partially and fitfully.   My core 
contention is that Weber’s concepts of class, status group, and party need to be understood as 
an interdependent conceptual system designed specifically to clarify the transformation of 
relatively objective structural situations that may or may not direct social action, and may or 
may not do this in a collective way, into more consciously made structures that do guide 
collective social action (cf. Roth 1978: LXXXVII).  Weber’s main concern was not to 
demonstrate the multifaceted nature of stratification (something he probably considered fairly 
obvious), but rather to address what has come to be known as the structure/agency problem. 
  In Weber’s terminology, classes, status groups and parties outline a continuum from 
relatively unconscious to relatively conscious forms of collective social action: 
 
In our terminology, “classes” are not communities; they merely represent possible, 
and frequent, bases for social action.  We may speak of a “class” when (1) a number 
of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, insofar 
as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the 
possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the 
conditions of the commodity or labor markets.  This is “class situation” (1978: 927). 
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In contrast to classes, Stände (status groups) are normally groups.  They are, however, 
often of an amorphous kind.  In contrast to the purely economically determined “class 
situation”, we wish to designate as status situation every typical component of the life 
of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, estimation of social 
honor.  This honor may be connected with any quality shared by a plurality, and, of 
course, it can be knit to a class situation: class distinctions are linked in the most 
varied ways with status distinctions (1978: 932). 
 
Whereas the genuine place of classes is within the economic order, the place of status 
groups is within the social order, that is, within the sphere of the distribution of honor.  
From within these spheres, classes and status groups influence one another and the 
legal order and are in turn influenced by it.  “Parties” reside in the sphere of power.  
Their action is oriented toward the acquisition of social power, that is to say, toward 
influencing social action no matter what its content may be (1978: 938).  
 
  There are several things to notice from this set of definitions.  While no underlying principle 
of the determination of status groups and parties by class is invoked, it is observed that there 
often is a close relationship (especially in regard to property classes).  In turn, classes and 
status groups can provide the bases for the formation of parties, though this is not inevitable.  
The key point is to grasp the implied hierarchy of social action: classes are defined in terms 
of an objective situation, regardless of consciousness; status groups are, by definition, 
conscious to some degree of their group-ness, and mark this fact symbolically; and parties are 
formed expressly for the purpose of pursuing a political agenda.  It is important to bear in 
mind that Weber’s conception of parties was a broad one, designed to include parliamentary 
parties, but also something more like what we might call ‘institutional factions’.  They are 
organised groups that pursue an agenda within a specific legal-institutional context.  Thus the 
formation of rival cliques within bureaucracies, and the organisation and mobilisation of 
campaigning groups within civil society, would also serve as examples of ‘parties’ in 
Weber’s terms.  More generally, this highlights the point that Weber was trying to devise 
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highly general concepts that could be applied over a vast field of sociohistorical cases, he was 
not trying to create concepts specific to nineteenth- and twentieth-century industrial society. 
  We should be aware of how these three concepts map onto another important distinction in 
Weber’s work: non-legitimate versus legitimate domination.  He defined domination as ‘...the 
probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given 
group of persons...’ (1978: 212).  But he emphasised the difference between the situational 
and systemic ‘commands’ that people encounter (and often obey) as actors in the 
marketplace, from commands based on some form of authority that requires legitimation, 
either on rational, traditional, or charismatic grounds (1978: 215).  Although authority, or 
‘legitimate domination’, may be underwritten by economic power, particularly in the form of 
monopoly, this economic domination is not ‘legitimate’ insofar as it is encountered by social 
actors as a given, ‘natural’ condition that guides action, rather than as a willed command that 
may require justification (1978: 941-48).4  To put it bluntly and somewhat crudely, classes 
act primarily within the sphere of non-legitimate domination (the economy), and status 
groups and parties act in the sphere of legitimate domination, and thus often involve 
dynamics of power that must be legitimised by claims to authority.  Moreover, being based 
on different principles, the system of legitimated status group power (honour) may often 
come into fundamental conflict with the system on non-legitimate market power: ‘As to the 
general effect of the status order, only one consequence can be stated, but it is a very 
important one: the hindrance of the free development of the market’ (1978: 937). 
  Let me steer us back to Scotland now.  The preceding discussion leaves us with two 
questions: (1) we have talked about classes and parties in Scotland, but where do ‘status 
groups’ fit in; and (2) how does Weber’s system, as I have presented it here, help us analyse 
the Scottish case?   First, in Scotland, the social space that Weber allocates to status groups is 
prominently occupied by what has been called ‘civil society’, suggesting the conceptual 
mapping: 
 
 CLASS  STATUS GROUPS   PARTIES  
 CLASS  CIVIL SOCIETY   PARTIES 
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  I am not trying to suggest a conceptual identity between status groups and civil society, but 
simply a high degree of conceptual overlap.  Weber himself said status groups are an 
amorphous category, that range from loosely bounded social strata that mark themselves off 
from others and make claims to prestige through patterns of consumption, club memberships, 
and probabilities of intermarriage, to the closed, endogamous ranks of elaborated caste 
systems.  Interestingly, his notion of status groups seems to rely on a combination of milieu--
i.e., social circles and frequencies of interaction--and specific institutionalised forms of 
interaction, both in terms of practices (in his own case, duelling!), and organisations (social 
clubs, charities, debating societies, etc.).  I think the parallels here to the concept of civil 
society are striking, in that it is used both to refer to a rather amorphous social sphere in 
which people interact according to principles of civility, and to a more concrete nexus of 
institutions and organisations.  Moreover, just as the Hindu caste system consists of varnas 
subdivided into numerous jati (the normal, more localised and craft/trade-based sense of 
caste), we can think of Scottish civil society as a macro status group made up of smaller 
status groups, albeit without the same kind of clear and ritualised internal ranking.   
  Status groups are about claims to status, and so is civil society in Scotland.  In the public 
discourse, it is not simply a technical designation of a range of institutions, it carries 
immediate evaluative content, suggesting a certain civic nobility shared by those identifying 
themselves as such.  Furthermore, Weber noted that status groups can be marked either by 
positive or negative prestige.  I would suggest that when clusters of status groups become 
involved in political struggles there is likely to be an active contest over interpretations of 
negative and positive prestige.  Thus, as I have argued, in Scotland ‘civil society’ is largely a 
gloss for the middle and professional classes of the salariat, Gouldner’s ‘New Class’, and 
their privileged role in the delivery systems of the modern (welfare) state.  This group, or 
social range, came increasingly to know itself as oppressed and maligned civil society 
precisely during a period in which it was being demonised in terms of neoliberal ideology, 
and its fate rendered less secure.  Whatever the state of class struggle might be, here we have 
a case of institutionalised status struggles.  And that status struggle has in many ways centred 
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around a conflict over the proper boundaries of market relations--Scottish civil society, in 
classic status group fashion, has defended its privileges and has posed a ‘hindrance’ to the 
unlimited expansion of the free market, generating an explicit discourse about, and 
justification of, its rejection of extreme neoliberal principles. 
  As  I suggested above, the key thing that distinguishes status groups from classes is that they 
have a sense of their own collective identity--this is necessary in order to make status 
distinctions.5  I would suggest, conversely, that where there is identity we will find status 
groups.  Therefore, following Weber, I suspect the examination of  the role of identity in 
politics needs to look for the linkages between status group processes of formation and 
deformation and espousals of identity.  The connection between identity and voting behaviour 
highlighted by Brown et al. (1999) is not all that surprising, indeed one might question the 
degree to which these are independent variables.  It is how both of these are shaped through a 
history of status struggles, conducted through nationalised politics and government and civil 
society institutions that needs to investigated.  By this reckoning, the pronounced sense of 
Scottishness that seems so pervasive in Scottish society today, is a result of this heightened 
articulation of Scottish identity generated by an embattled civil society defending its own 
status, and generalising it to the population at large, in pursuit of its own legitimacy.  This 
struggle in the mid-range is only exaggerated by a field of political parties which must pursue 
their own support and legitimacy in the same terms, as standing up for Scotland and its civic 
institutions. 
 
Conclusion: 
  Nationalism in Scotland is frequently compared to similar movements in other western, 
industrialised liberal democracies, most notably in Catalonia and Québec.  Under various 
rubrics, such as ‘third wave ethnic demotic nationalisms’ (Smith 1991: 138), ‘stateless 
nation-building’ (Keating 1997), ‘nations without states’ (Guibernau 1999), and perhaps most 
generally ‘neo-nationalism’ (Nairn 1975), these cases have been commonly bundled together.  
They are usually characterised as being ambiguous about whether autonomy or independence 
is being sought, as involving dual and embedded identities in relation to nations and states 
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that are not congruent, and as being well grounded in coherent civil societies (McCrone 1998: 
128-129).  The implication of the argument presented here is that it would be worth looking 
more closely at what is called civil society in several of these cases, and asking to what 
degree it defines a zone of institutions and career paths occupied by late twentieth-century 
New Classes seeking to reconstitute the institutional bases of their power and status within 
constitutional states which are themselves under new pressures from a global neoliberal 
economic regime.  No doubt the defence of cultural identities embodied in such things as 
language is an important factor, perhaps more so in most other case of neo-nationalism than 
in Scotland, but it is in the nexus of class fractions, status groups, and civil society, that 
cultural and political claims upon and against the state, are forged and pursued. 
 
 
Notes 
 
                                                 
1 Based on Goldthorpe-Heath social class groupings around occupational clusters. 
2  Fevre et al. (1997) also argue for the usefulness of Weber’s class/status group/party model 
for the study of nationalism, although unlike the present study, their application of these 
concepts to matters of language and social closure in Wales does not address the potential 
relevance of civil society. 
3 While Weber rarely engaged Marx directly, his immediate intellectual milieu included 
historical materialist theories such as those of Sombart, Schmoller, and Lukács, and he was 
always concerned to challenge over-generalisation and a priori reasoning in social and 
historical analyses (cf. Roth 1978: LXIX-LXXIII). 
4 Thus  Weber treats his study of the City (particularly the occidental city) as a study of non-
legitimate domination, in that for him ‘A city is always a market center’ (1978: 1213).   
5 It should be noted however that although Weber appears to have usually thought of status 
groups as regularly arrayed in terms of clear hierarchical rankings, status group relations 
could be much more fluid, and the example of the Hindu caste system is at one extreme.  
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